Egypt: an economic geography The state of Egypt · 7
(CAPMAS, annually 1988–95). This consumer price increase of about 230 per
cent was accompanied by a per capita GNP increase of only 47 per cent. If
one takes into account the fact that the per capita GNP of the great majority
of Egyptians is less than one-third of the country’s average, one recognizes
that the real effect of consumer price inflation is even greater. In 1998, for
instance, per capita GNP in Egypt was calculated to be US$1,290 on average.
But 86 per cent of the population shared only 26 per cent of the country’s
GNP, while 74 per cent was enjoyed by only 14 per cent of Egyptians. This
means that 86 per cent of the people had an average per capita GNP of only
US$392, while 14 per cent had an average of US$6,863 per capita (Al-Wafd,
30 December 1999: 6), as one Egyptian economist has pointed out. Accord-
ing to the same source, 8.5 million households, i.e. about 55 per cent of the
Egyptian population, had a monthly income of LE100–500 (= US$28–140;
LE = Egyptian pound) and came under the absolute poverty line of US$1/day
per capita. An official survey conducted by CAPMAS in 1999/2000 showed
that the daily per capita income was distributed as follows: 20 per cent of
the Egyptian population earned less than US$1, while 50 per cent earned
US$1–2, and 30 per cent earned more than US$2. The overall average was
US$2, which indicates a highly inequitable income distribution (Gamal-el-Din
2001). Heikal (1995) cites an international study of income distribution in
Egypt according to which some 74,000 citizens possess wealth totalling about
US$650 billion (see Table 1.1). He remarks that Egyptian experts consider this
result to be a stark underestimate of the real state of wealth concentration
in Egypt. Besides, the study left out real estate, such as the skyscrapers on
the Nile, and also neglected Egyptian multimillionaires living abroad. Heikal
stresses the fact that nine-tenths of this wealth was generated by corrupt and
unlawful means – the use of political influence when granting commercial
concessions for strategic commodities like weapons, iron, cement, sugar and
meat (including the import of cheap meat, whose permitted date of consump
(CAPMAS, annually 1988–95). This consumer price increase of about 230 per
cent was accompanied by a per capita GNP increase of only 47 per cent. If
one takes into account the fact that the per capita GNP of the great majority
of Egyptians is less than one-third of the country’s average, one recognizes
that the real effect of consumer price inflation is even greater. In 1998, for
instance, per capita GNP in Egypt was calculated to be US$1,290 on average.
But 86 per cent of the population shared only 26 per cent of the country’s
GNP, while 74 per cent was enjoyed by only 14 per cent of Egyptians. This
means that 86 per cent of the people had an average per capita GNP of only
US$392, while 14 per cent had an average of US$6,863 per capita (Al-Wafd,
30 December 1999: 6), as one Egyptian economist has pointed out. Accord-
ing to the same source, 8.5 million households, i.e. about 55 per cent of the
Egyptian population, had a monthly income of LE100–500 (= US$28–140;
LE = Egyptian pound) and came under the absolute poverty line of US$1/day
per capita. An official survey conducted by CAPMAS in 1999/2000 showed
that the daily per capita income was distributed as follows: 20 per cent of
the Egyptian population earned less than US$1, while 50 per cent earned
US$1–2, and 30 per cent earned more than US$2. The overall average was
US$2, which indicates a highly inequitable income distribution (Gamal-el-Din
2001). Heikal (1995) cites an international study of income distribution in
Egypt according to which some 74,000 citizens possess wealth totalling about
US$650 billion (see Table 1.1). He remarks that Egyptian experts consider this
result to be a stark underestimate of the real state of wealth concentration
in Egypt. Besides, the study left out real estate, such as the skyscrapers on
the Nile, and also neglected Egyptian multimillionaires living abroad. Heikal
stresses the fact that nine-tenths of this wealth was generated by corrupt and
unlawful means – the use of political influence when granting commercial
concessions for strategic commodities like weapons, iron, cement, sugar and
meat (including the import of cheap meat, whose permitted date of consump
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